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The Migration Crisis is today at the core of the EU agenda and yet 
poses a major challenge to intra-EU solidarity mechanisms. Since 
the beginning of the Syrian conflict, almost three million first-
time applications have been registered in EU states (plus Norway 
and Switzerland), of which 650,250 and 199,205 are, respectively, 
Syrians and Iraqis. In the same period, 1.6 million migrants 
arrived on the southern borders of Europe by boat, while 13,179 
people died in the waters of the Mediterranean1. In this policy 
brief, EU ad hoc programmes for the management of the Crisis 
are discussed. At the time of writing, the core programmes consist 
of 1) a Relocation Scheme; 2) a Resettlement Scheme; and 3) the 
18/03 EU-Turkey Agreement.  
1. Source: Migration Policy Centre (http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/
migrant-crisis/)
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Relocation Scheme (started September 
2015)
In September 2015, to alleviate the burden on Italy 
and Greece of mass arrivals of refugees, the Justice 
and Home Affairs Council decided to relocate 
160,000 people in clear need of international 
protection from those two countries. Two 
decisions were adopted to relocate 106,000 asylum 
seekers plus another 54,000 “unless a proposal 
is submitted by the Commission to the Council 
before 26 September 2016 to adapt the relocation 
mechanism”2  (EU, 2015). In other words, asylum 
2. Accordingly, after the 18/03 EU-Turkey Agreement, on 21 
March 2016 the Commission tabled a proposal to make 
the 54,000 places initially set aside for relocation, avail-
able for the purpose of admitting Syrians from Turkey to 
the EU through the resettlement scheme. The proposal is 
still pending.
seekers were to be relocated from Greece and Italy to 
other EU MSs where they would have their asylum 
applications processed. If these applications were 
successful, then applicants would be granted refugee 
status with the right to reside in the Member State 
to which they were relocated. All relocations would 
take place over two years and the scheme would 
be mandatory for all EU MSs with the exception 
of the UK and Ireland; Ireland subsequently chose 
to opt in. In addition, Norway, Switzerland, and 
Liechtenstein also gave their availability. Table 1 
describes the state of play of the Relocation Scheme 
since its beginning (on September 2015) as of April 
14.
EU MSs Places made 
available
Relocations Remaining places f
rom the 160,000 (2)
From Italy  (A) From Greece (B) Total (A+B)
Austria (1)  -  -  - - 1,953
Belgium 30 24  - 24 3,788
Bulgaria 1,302  - 4 4 1,298
Croatia  -  -  - - 968
Cyprus 30  6 6 314
Czech Republic 30  -  - - 2,691
Denmark  -  -  - - -
Estonia 46  7 7 322
Finland 270 148 111 259 1,819
France 1,300 137 242 379 19,335
Germany 40 20 37 57 27,479
Greece      
Hungary  -  -  - - 1,294
Ireland 50  - 10 10 590
Italy      
Latvia 481  - 21 21 460
Lithuania 100  - 6 6 665
Table 1 - Relocated migrants from Greece and Italy to other EU MSs by EU MS (as of 14 April 2016)
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The Relocation Scheme has clearly been inefficient. 
The Scheme is to last for two years, i.e. from 
September 2015 to September 2017 and relocate 
160,000 asylum applicants, or 6,667 persons 
per month. As of April 14, the total number of 
relocations stands at 1,195 persons – i.e. 0.7% of 
160,000 – or around 171 migrants per month. So 
far, the most “generous” states have been France 
(31.7%), Finland (21.7%) and Portugal (15.1%). The 
lack of intra-EU solidarity appears to be the main 
obstacle to the correct functioning of the Scheme.
Resettlement Scheme (started July 2015) 
On 20 July 2015, 27 EU Member States and Dublin 
Associated States agreed – on a voluntary basis 
– to resettle through multilateral and national 
schemes 22,054 displaced persons in clear need 
of international protection from states in the 
Middle East, the North of Africa and the Horn 
of Africa. Following the EU-Turkey Agreement 
of 18 March 2016, it is expected that most of the 
remaining places will be filled up by those coming 
from Turkey (EC, 2015). Resettlements seem to be 
“functioning better” than relocations. The scheme 
is planned to last for two years, i.e. from July 2015 
to July 2017 and to resettle a total of 22,504 persons: 
this corresponds to 938 persons per month. In the 
first nine months of the programme a number of 
people were resettled: 5,598 “under the 20 July 
scheme” plus another 79 persons “under the EU-
Turkey Agreement” as of, respectively, 11 and 14 
April (Table 2). This corresponds to 631 resettled 
people per month, i.e. 307 persons fewer than the 
planned number.
Luxembourg 150  - 30 30 527
Malta 131 15 6 21 110
Netherlands 200 50 48 98 5,849
Poland 100  -  - - 6,192
Portugal 1,642 92 89 181 2,767
Romania 515 6 29 35 4,145
Slovakia  -  -  - - 902
Slovenia 40  -  - - 567
Spain 200 18  - 18 9,255
Sweden 300 39  - 39 3,727
UK (1)  -  -  -  -  -
Norway  -  -  - - -
Switzerland 30  -  - - -
Liechtenstein 43  -  - - -
Iceland  -  -  - - -
Total 7,030 549 646 1,195 97,017
Foreseen total 160,000 39,600 66,400 106,000 160,000
% of foreseen total 4.39 1.39 0.97 1.13 60.64
(1) In Austria, the agreement is suspended for one year. The UK did not take part in the agreement. 
(2) Out of 160,000, 61,744 decisions need still to be allocated while 1,239 were excluded.
Source: Author’s elaboration on European Commission data (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/euro-
pean-agenda-migration/press-material/index_en.htm ), retrieved on 22/04/2016
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Source: Author’s elaboration on European Commission data (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/euro-
pean-agenda-migration/press-material/index_en.htm), retrieved on 22/04/2016
 “Normal” resettlements from Third Countries (un-
der the 20 July Scheme)
(Period: 20/07/2015 – 11/04/2016)
Resettlements of Syrians from Turkey (un-
der the 1:1 EU-TUR Agreement)
(Period: 04/04/2016 – 14/04/2016)
Austria 1,395  -
Belgium 212  -
Bulgaria  -  -
Croatia  -  -
Cyprus  -  -
Czech Republic 52  -
Denmark 481  -
Estonia  -  -
Finland 63 11
France 72  -
Germany  - 37
Greece  -  -
Hungary  -  -
Ireland 258  -
Italy 96  -
Latvia  -  -
Lithuania  -  -
Luxembourg  -  -
Malta  -  -
Netherlands 301 31
Poland  -  -
Portugal  -  -
Romania  -  -
Slovakia  -  -
Slovenia  -  -
Spain  -  -
Sweden  -  -
UK 1,864  -
Norway 323  -
Switzerland 413  -
Liechtenstein 20  -
Iceland 48  -
Total 5,598 79
Foreseen total 22,504
% of foreseen total 25.23
Table 2 – Resettled persons from Middle East, North of Africa and Horn of Africa to EU MSs under the “20 July 
scheme” and the “1:1 EU-Turkey Agreement” (as of 11 and 14 April 2016)
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The EU-Turkey Agreement (18 March 
2016): the 1:1 resettlement-return 
scheme 
On 18 April 2016, the EU and Turkey agreed on the 
following action points to end irregular migration 
along the Eastern Mediterranean route (EC, 2016):  
1) All new irregular migrants crossing from  
Turkey to the Greek islands, as of 20 March  
2016, will be returned to Turkey;
2) For every Syrian being returned to Turkey 
from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be 
resettled in the EU;
3) Turkey will take necessary measures to prevent 
new sea or land routes for irregular migration 
opening from Turkey to the EU;
4) Once irregular crossings between Turkey and 
the EU end or have been substantially reduced, 
a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme 
will be activated;
5) The fulfilment of the visa liberalization roadmap 
will be accelerated with a view to lifting visa 
requirements for Turkish citizens, at the latest, 
by the end of June 2016. Turkey will take all 
the necessary steps to fulfil the remaining 
requirements;
6) The EU will, in close cooperation with Turkey, 
further speed up the disbursement of the €3 
billion initially allocated under the Facility for 
Refugees in Turkey. Once these resources are 
almost spent, the EU will mobilize additional 
funding for the Facility up to an additional €3 
billion till the end of 2018;
7) The EU and Turkey welcomed the ongoing work 
on the upgrading of the Customs Union.
8) The accession process will be re-energized, 
with Chapter 33 to be opened during the Dutch 
Presidency of the Council of the European 
Union and preparatory work on the opening 
of other chapters to continue at an accelerated 
pace;
Figure 1 – Resettlements and returns under the EU-Turkey 1:1 Mechanism, 4/04 - 15/04, 2016
Source: Author’s elaboration on European Commission data (http://
ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
migration/press-material/index_en.htm ), retrieved on 22/04/2016
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9) The EU and Turkey will work to improve 
humanitarian conditions inside Syria.
Figure 1 shows some first statistics on the 
implementation of points 1) and 2), that is on the 1:1 
relocation-return mechanism, according to which 
for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the 
Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from 
Turkey. From its beginning – from 4 to 15 of April 
2016 –, a total of 79 Syrians had been resettled from 
Turkey to three EU MSs, while 325 people had been 
returned from Greece to Turkey.
As to the implementation and functioning of 
the agreement, several doubts emerge. First, the 
1:1 mechanism has apparently failed. In the first 
ten days, there is a high number of returns (325) 
and a low number of resettlements (79). In other 
words, like for previous programmes, the intra-EU 
solidarity does not seem to work. Why should we 
expect it to work in the future? 
Though it is certainly too early to evaluate the impact 
of the EU-Turkey Agreement on irregular migration 
to the EU, some numbers may help in understanding 
its first developments. Figure 2 shows arrivals at sea3 
along the Central and the Eastern Mediterranean 
route in 2016 on a fifteen-day basis. From 5 January 
to 19 March, 90.4% of total arrivals (130,246) took 
place along the Eastern Mediterranean route. After 
the EU-Turkey Agreement – which took effect 20 
March – a decrease of arrivals along the Eastern 
route was accompanied by a parallel increase in the 
(more perilous) Central route: from 20 March to 
19 April 2016, the share of arrivals to Greek Islands 
out of total arrivals (19,227) dropped to 30.7%. Will 
migrants simply opt for other routes – as already 
occurred many times in the past (Fargues, 2015) – 
in response to the EU-Turkey Agreement?
Additional concerns apply to the status of returned 
people. What will happen to returned people 
as Turkey is not a full member of the Geneva 
Convention?4 What will their legal status be? On 
3. Only arrivals at sea (and not by land) are here shown in 
order to control for seasonal effects and thus to correctly 
compare the Eastern with the Central Mediterranean 
routes.
4. In Turkey non-European refugees are eligible only for 
Figure 2 – Arrivals at sea along the Eastern (Greece) and Central (Italy) Mediterranean route, 
5 January-19 April 2016
Source: UNHCR (Greece), Ministry of Interior (Italy)
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what legal basis can people in need of international 
protection be returned? Is the “inadmissibility 
clause” a valid – and fair – solution for people in 
need of protection? According to the EC (2016), 
people are returned Greece to Turkey according 
to two different legal frameworks: 1) for irregular 
migrants who do not have a right to international 
protection, they are returned immediately under the 
bilateral readmission agreement between Greece 
and Turkey, which will be succeeded by the EU-
Turkey Readmission Agreement from 1 June 2016; 
2) for people who apply for asylum, Greece will make 
use of the inadmissibility of applications clause. 
Apparently, the EU asylum rules allow Member 
States in certain clearly defined circumstances to 
declare an application “inadmissible”, that is to 
say, to reject the application without examining 
the substance. There are two legal possibilities 
that could be envisaged for declaring asylum 
applications inadmissible in relation to Turkey 
(EC, 2016):
• first country of asylum (Article 35 of the Asylum 
Procedures Directive): where the person has been 
already recognized as a refugee in that country or 
otherwise enjoys sufficient protection there;
• safe third country (Article 38 of the Asylum 
Procedures Directive): where the person has not 
already received protection in the third country 
but the third country can guarantee effective 
access to protection to the readmitted person.
In accordance with this framework, Greece recently 
adapted “its legislation to provide a legal framework 
for the implementation of the ‘first safe country of 
asylum’ and ‘safe third country’ principles” before 
starting returning people to Turkey on 4 April. Does 
this mean that Turkey became a “safe country” 
overnight? Moreover, is Turkey a safe country for 
refugees and asylum seekers? According to field 
temporary asylum. But the 2013 Law on Foreigners and 
International Protection provides them, at least on the pa-
per, with rights close to those guaranteed by the Conven-
tion (Fargues, 2015).
research conducted by Amnesty International, 
since September 2015, perhaps hundreds of 
refugees and asylum seekers have been transported 
by Turkish authorities to isolated detention centres. 
Some of them reported being shackled for days on 
end, beaten and forcibly transported back to the 
countries they have fled (Amnesty International, 
2015). And finally, what to expect for Syrians, 
but also Iraqis and Afghanis to whom Turkey 
does not apply the Geneva Convention? Since 
mid-January 2016, the Turkish authorities have 
been rounding up and expelling groups of around 
100 Syrian men, women and children to Syria on 
a near-daily basis. Moreover, at the end of March, 
Amnesty International researchers gathered 
multiple testimonies of large-scale returns from 
Hatay province (Amnesty International, 2016). 
To conclude, despite there still being many 
uncertainties, what is clear about the EU-Turkey 
Agreement is that international economic migrants, 
refugees and their children, who risk their lives 
crossing the Mediterranean, have scarce or no 
safeguards against this plan; and being returned to 
Turkey is likely to jeopardize their lives. Once again, 
EU leaders have attempted to displace the problem 
elsewhere. Meanwhile, no concrete action is offered 
for the root causes of global refugee displacements: 
be these the Syrian conflict; endemic violence 
in Afghanistan and Iraq; poverty in Kosovo; or 
a myriad of other crises to the south and east of 
Europe.
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